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This paper begins to study the reward—incentive. structure. in aequentia,l
knock—outor elimination tournaments with matched,pairwi.se. comparisons among
playersateach. stage.. The prize structure required to elicit constant
expected quality of play in all matches throughout the. tournament is character-
ized for competition. among equally talented (or perfectly handIcapped), players.
The incentive maintaining prize structure is shown to concentrate' extra weight
on the top ranking prize, aphetiomenon.observed in most tournaments.. More can.
be said. Prizes that maintain performance incentives at all stages award a
constant increment for each match won up to the last stage; andanamount
greater than this for the player who wins the final match. lay'era' incen-
tives to performin early rounds are propelled by the probability' of achieving
higher ranks and surviving to later stages where. rewards arelarger.. These
continuation options are played out in the final match, so it is only' the
differencebetween winning and losing prizes in the finals that controls
incentives there.
Manyathletic tournaments are structured in the manner analyzed here,
butthe general framework ultimately may have application to certain career
games as well. More generally, a tournament structure may he viewed as a
statistical,experimental design problem.The prize structure interacts with.
thedesign in providing incentives for the best players to surviveto the
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A number of recent papers have clarified the problem of incentives
in simple one—shot games when players are paid on the basis of rank or
relative performance [Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983),
NalebufT and Stiglitz (1983), O'Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (19814),
Holmstrom (1982)]. The chief result available so far is that rank/relative
reward schemes can lead to efficient performance incentives, especially when
precise measurement of individual outcomes is costly and when environmental
factors (the "conditions of play") equally influence the connection between
input and outcomes for all players. These models do not, however, yield
many restrictions on what the resulting prize structure might look like.
Yet prizes are observed to be heavily concentrated on the top ranks in most
professional tournaments. See table 1.
This paper begins to investigate the structure of prizes in
sequential elimination tournaments, where rewards are increasing in
survival. Many athletic tournaments are organized in this way. Tennis
immediately comes to mind (e.g., Wimbledon), but end of season playoffs in
most team sports also follow this design (with entry conditioned on2
standings in the regular season round robin). In what follows, the rank—
reward structure required to maintain constant expected performance
throughout the tournament is characterized for games involving equally
talented players. The incentive maintaining prize schedule is shown to be
convex in rank order. More surprisingly, it is fully described in figure 1.
Let WR be the prize offered for achieving rank R in the tournament. Then
constant incentives requires WR —
WR+l
-Yfor R > 2 and W1 -
W2> 1, where
4puiL.iV numoer.rtewruincreae Linearly in rang urder fruin
(n+1)st place through second place, but the first place prize takes a
distinct jump, out of sync with and of a different character from the rest.
"More convexity" than shown in figure 1 leads to increasing intensity or
expected quality of play in the later stages of the tournament; and "less
convexity" leads to declining expected quality of play as the tournament
proceeds through its stages.
The economic interpretation of this result is interesting and
appealing. The prize structure in figure 1 implies a fixed incremental
reward of I for advancing one more round from the beginning of the
tournament up to the finals. However, a player's valuation of continuation
in these stages exceeds the interrank reward difference (I) because there is
a nontrivial probability of surviving longer than one more round and winning
an even larger prize. The value of continuation includes these higher order
terms, and it is this value that sets a player's incentives to perform,' not
the interrarik reward difference itself. But when a player has reached the
finals, there is no possibility of further continuation. The incremental
value of winning the finals is WI —
W2alone. The difference between first
and second place prize money is the sole instrument available for incentive
maintenance in the finals, because there is no possibility of further3
advancement,as there is at earlier stages of the game. That W1 —
W2
exceeds the other interrank reward differences therefore is fundamentally
due to the no—tomorrow aspect of playing in the finals. Raising W1 —
abovey effectively extends the horizon of players reaching the finals,
similar to the role of a pension in finitely repeated principal and agent
problems [Becker and Stigler (197k)].
The next section describes the structure of the game and some
notation. The strategies of players are set forth in section II. Sequen-
tial Nash strategies are adopted as the equilibrium concept, Since there is
a natural end point, the method of solution Is backward recursion, analyzing
the finals and working one step at a time back to earlier stages of the
game. The principal result on incentive maintaining prize structures is
established in section III and is further discussed and qualified in section
Iv.
I. DESIGN OF THE GAME
The tournament begins with identical players in the Initial
round and proceeds sequentially In n distinct stages. Each stage is a set
of paired matches with pairings randomly drawn among players eligible to
enter that stage. Winners of these matches survive to the next round, where
another pairing is drawn randomly, while losers are eliminated from all
subsequent play. Thus half of all eligibles at any stage maintain
eligibility and continue to the next, and the other half are eliminated at
the end of their matches, See figure 2. All who lose eligibility at the
same stage achieve the same rank in the tournament. No branching matches
are offered for breaking ties (however, see section IV for some analysis of
consolation matches). For example, the two losers of the semifinals achieve14
3rdrank,the four losers of the quarter finals achieve 4th rank, etc. More
generally, if sisthe number of stages remaining to be played
(equivalently, the maximum possible number of matches a currently eligible
contestant can play in the remainder of the tournament), all losers of the
next matches achieve rank s +1and all are awarded prize W51, for
s—i
S0,1, ...,n.There are 2 such players, for s >2, sothe amount
paid to all playe's achieving (s+l)st place is 21W51. Of course there is
a single wInner. PrIzes aredesIgnatedifl advance of the fIrst round and
are strictly increasing in rank: W5÷1 > W52, for all s. We study how the
sequence (W1} affects the sequence of incentives to win at various stages
of the game.
There are two features of these games that make it meaningless to
specify Input—output technologies and "marginal products" of contestants in
the oPdinary sense. First, competition is naturally relative because It
Involves face—to—face confrontation in most instances. Success depends on
both offensive and defensive skills. Second, these games have an essential
ordinal character because-the calibration of point scores used to determine
winners and losers has many arbitrary elements, much in common with the
scores on a classroom test. For example, the nature of the game of tennis
would be greatly affected by altering the height of the net, changing the
size and composition of the court or adjusting the compression of the ball.
The adopted standards and operating rules of the game have large effects on
the productivity of various personal dimensions of talent, for example those
affecting power, finesse and endurance1. For this reason point scales have
little' sense of cardinality. The best one can do for analysis is specify
how players' actions affect the probability of winning.5
The probability of winning a match is assumed to follow a Poisson
process, a specification which has been used to great advantage in the
recent liteature on patent races, from which It is borrowed [see especially
Loury (1979); also Kamien and Schwartz (1972), Lee and Wilde (1979), and
Reinganum (1982); Telser (1982) considers some sequential elements of these
problems]. Let x index the intensity of effort expended by a player in some
match. If player i is matched against player j the probability that i wins
the match is assumed to follow the law
h(xi)
(1) P(X.X)h(xi) +h(x)
with h(x) strictly increasing in x and h(O)0. A player increases the
probability of winning the match by exerting greater effort given the effort
of the opponent.
Two features of (1) are noteworthy. First, that the function h(x)
is the same for all players embodies the assumption that all are equally
talented. When two players exert the same effort (1) implies that the
probability of either one winning is one—half ——entirelyrandom outcomes.
If players are not equally talented h(x) must be indexed by ability and the
stronger player has a winning edge at equal effort levels (see section IV).
Second, (1) neatly accomodates common environmental factors that influence
the quality of play. Let the common factor multiply h(x). Then whether the
commonality is match specific, stage specific or tournament specific, it
factors out of the probability calculation in any match and at any stage of
the game. It therefore has no effect on incentives.6
Specification (1) has a racing game interpretation. Let tbe
arrival time from the beginning of the match. Then h1 -h(x1)
is the
probability of "crossing the finish line" at r given that player I has been
racing up to t.Theunconditional duration density of finishing at t
—hit
exactly is.f1(t)h1e and its CDF is 1 —e .Expectedfinishing
time for i is 1/h1. The player who arrives first is declared winner of the
match: (1) gives the probability of this event. Expected finishing time in
an (i,j) match Is (h1 +h)1.
While this interpretation is a bit strained
in context, its spirit is maintained by identifying "shorter" expected match
completion time with higher quality of play. In any case it is (1) that is
the primative construct for this problem, not the particular route by which
it is generated. Merely think of (1) and its counterpart for player jas
symmetric functions where the values of the arguments (xi, x) determine the
expected quality of the match, and p(x, x) —1/2for x > 0.
II. STRATEGIES AND INCENTIVES
A player's decision of how much effort to expend in any match
depends on a cost—benefit calculation, Greater effort at any stage in
creases the probability of achieving a higher rank and larger prize money,
but involves additional cost. There are two complications. First, the
anticipated value of advancing to a subsequent stage depends on future
effort expenditures. In deciding how much to put out in the current match,
a player must anticipate how he will behave should eligibility be maintained
in more advanced stages of the tournament. This. difficulty is common to all
intertemporal decision problems and is solved by backward recursion.
Second, the cost—benefit calculation for any player depends on anticipated7
actions of opponents in all possible future matches as well as in the cur-
rent one. Given the sequential character of the game, this is best analyzed
by adopting Nash noncooperative strategies as the equilibrium concept at
each stage. I ignore time discounting between stages arid, for now, assume
players are risk neutral. It is also assumed that each match is Independ-
ent: costs incurred in previous matches have no carry overs and do not
affect either costs or the probability of success in subsequent matches.
Define V5 as the value of playing a match when s possible stages
remain in the tournament, and define p5 by (1) as the probability of winning
the match and maintaining eligibility into the next stage. Let c(x) be the
cost of effort in any match and assume nondecreasing marginal cost:
c'(x) > 0 and c"(x) > 0, and c(O) —0.The value V5 consists of two
components. One is the prize awarded to players achieving (5+1 )st
place in the tournament if the match is lost and the player is eliminated,
an event which occurs with probability (1 —p5).The other component is the
value of achieving a rank superior to s+1 lithe match is won. The value of
winning is eligibility in the next stage, V51, an event which occurs with
probability p5. Therefore,
(2) V5 -ma:[p8V51 +(1—p3)W31
—
wherex is effort expended in the current match. I shall place sufficient
structure on h(x) and c(x) to guarantee a unique equlibrium at each stage.2
Analysis begins with the Finals. Define V0 — andsubstitute
(1) into (2) for s1. The value of achieving the finals for player i in a
match against player j is8





where h1 is shorthand for h(x1) and similarly for h. To avoid notational
clutter it is understood thatthex's in (3) refer to the final round and
are not subscripted by s -1.The best response of player I to the op-

















where h h"(x,) and p,
h1/(h1+h).
must be negative at the solution
for (14)todescribe a local maximum of (3) given x,. It proves convenient
to express (5) slightly differently. Define the elasticities






Comparative statics on (14) yields:
c'(x1)/(W —W2)
(7) ax1/a(w1—W2) — —A
1
> 09
Second place money is assured if the player has reached the finals and
players are contesting over the difference (W1 —
W2),so an increase in the
differential reward to winning elicits greater intensity of effort by i,
given x.
Differentiating (Il) with respect to x3 yields
ct(x1)(h/h)(h1 —h
(8) dxi/dx —_______________________
whichdefines the slope of player i's best response function with respect to
Xj. The response function x -X(x)
Is increasing inx3 when h1 > h., or
when x1 > x3. It is decreasing when > x1 and has a turning point at
x1 =x3,as shown in figure 3. At smaller values ofx, player i chooses x1
to have a winning edge over j. As x. increasesx1 responds positively to
maintain a smaller winning edge. However, forx3 sufficiently large, x1
chosen so that j has the winning edge: player j's effort is so great that
it doesn't pay player I to compete on equal or better terms. Asx3 in-
creases further, player i puts out less and less effort. If h" < 0 for all
x then< 0 for all x because r and c are both positive. ThenX(x3) is
continuous throughout its domain. However, if h" > 0 the elasticity of
h' (x) must be sufficiently small for (6) to hold true at all, and even so it
may fail for some values of Xj. If it does fail then X(x3) exhibits a point
of discontinuity. Examination of (6) shows that failure is more likely when
is small (so
Xjislarge). At some value of x3 and beyond the opponent
is putting forth so much effort that it is best for i to simply give up, to
set x1 —0and benignly accept his fate as sure loser. In this paper atten-
tion is confined to pure strategy equilibria. This requires that if (6)10
fails it must do so beyond the turning point of X(x.). For this we require
a strict upper bound on xh"/h'
The i—player's best reply function is the mirror image of that for
the 1—player. Therefore, if an equilibrium exists it is symmetric:
x —x
> 0, and (Z)reducesto
(9) h'(x*)/h(x*)[W1 —W2J/14c'(x*).
Using the elasticity definitions above, (9)maybe written equivalently as
(10) r(x*)/c(x*)[W1 —WJ/L$ c(x*).
In equilibrium p 1/2, both players have an equal chance of winning





The prizes are assumed to be sufficiently large thatV1 > 0.
One important detail remains. A global condition must be imposed
to rule Out x 0 as a best reply tox3 -xin order to guarantee exist-
ence of equilibrium (9). For this we require that V1 — >0. Otherwise
the best reply to x is x1 —0:Taking the sure loss is better than compet-
ing on equal terms. There cannot be a symmetric equilibrium at x -0
because }i(O) -0;and one player guarantees a win by exerting vanishing
small effort at vanishing small cost. But if one player can do this so can
the other and the ioint responses are driven back to x > 0 in figure 2.11
Therefore if both players can do better by taking a sure loss to exerting x
in (10) there can be no equilibrium in the game. SubstItuting (10) into







No player has incentives to default from x defined by (9) or (10) if
V1 —W2> 0, or
(13) (x)/c(x)<2
which will be assumed to hold true for all x.
The sense of condition (13) has independent interest and is re-
lated to the problem of' arms races and proposals for limitations on politi-
cal campaign expenditures. If the elasticity of response of effort is large
relative to the elasticity of its cost then both players' efforts to win
results in a negative sum game for which a stable equilibrium is not
defined. It is not Optimal for either player to default if the other one
does, but at the locally stable equilibrium the costs of contesting have
been escalated so far that both want to default. In athletic games this
problem is controlled by a supreme authority which reviews standards of play
from time to time and which limits rules changes and the introduction of new
equipment that would otherwise lead to problems.'
Now that V. has been nailed down we may proceed to analyze the
Semifinals. At s •2equation (2) becomes
(1k) V2 -max2i1 W3) +- c(x21)3.
x2112
Exactly the same line of argument as above establishes a unique nontrivial
symmetric equilibrium for which p21 —P2j
-1/2,with —x2
—x
determined by a condition analogous to (9)
(15) h'(x)/h(x)[V1 —W3]/II
—c'(x).







Notice that x depends on W1 and W2, from (9) and that V1 also depends on
and W2 (see equation (11)). It follows from (15) that x depends on W1, W.,
and W3. It is in this way that the effects of the structure of' prizes on
incentives at each stage of the game may be studied. The fact that the
equilibrium level of effort at any stage has no memory and is only forward
looking simplifies the problem considerably, and is due to the assumption
that effort at each stage has no spillovers to later stages.
Continuing in this manner, the solution at any stage is easily
established. When s stages remain to be played all surviving players in the
next match choose effort x to satisfy
(17) h'(x*)/h(x*)[V1 —W5_1]/1I
—c'(x).
An induction argument shows that condition (13) Is necessary for (17) to
describe a global best response for each player at any stage. In equi-
librium the probability of extinction in the next match is 1/2 at all stages
of the game. The probability that any player is eliminated at the end of13
stage s and receives payoff W841 is (1/2)n5+1• At the start of play all
players have the same chances in equilibrium of each rank because all are
equally talented and the equilibrium is symmetric at any stage5.
Substituting p -1/2into (2) and iterating yields








III. PRIZES THAT MAINTAIN INCENTIVES
A complete analysis of the optimal distribution of prizes requires
precise specification of what services these games produce and how produc-
tion affects willingness of consumers to pay to see them. The prize struc-
ture presumably evolves to produce the distribution in quality of play over
stages that maximizes tournament profits, given supplies and talents of the
players. Little can be said on this at present beyond the obvious that fan
interest is stimulated by the closeness of matches and by higher general
quality of play.
A less specific and at the same time less general question is
asked here. How should the purse be divided to elicit the same intensity of
play in every match at all stages of the game? What sequence {W31}
guarantees x -xfor all 5?Thisis a convenient benchmark because it
roughly indicates how an increasing (or decreasing) sequence of effort and
expected quality of play can be generated over the course of the tournament.
I believe the answer, which is depicted in figure 1, is one of the reasons
why prizes in real life tournaments are so heavily skewed toward the topiLl
ranks. proof that figure 1 provides a complete answer to the question
follows.
It is clear from (17) that the intensity of effort at each stage
is determined by V8_1 —W51,the incremental reward to winning the next
match. Maintenance of incentives at each stage therefore requires that
— havethe same value independent of s. An expression for
V5_1 — isobtained by iterating (18) one step and subtracting
After imposing the constraint that x5 •xwe obtain
w+w w w
(19) v—w —
12 3+ si 5+1281 282 2 5+1
-c(x*)[1-2(51)J/(1/2)
Iterate (19) backward one step to obtain a sImilar expression for V5 —W5.
Equating the two expressions yields
(20) + + + (3/2)W51
-
W52c(x*)/22
as the condition that prizes must satisfy in order to guarantee effort x* at
every stage of the game.
To eliminate c(x*) in (20) iterate it one step forward, multiply




which holds for all stages other than the finals. The characteristic equa-
tion of (21) has two unit roots, so the solution is linear in s. Since W
must be declining in a in order for players to have incentives to continue
playing, we have, for a > 2
(22) W —W -y
S 5+1
with I > 0. Apart from a lump sum payment (possibly negative) at the begin—
fling of the tournament, incentive maintenance implies that players receive a
fixed reward y for each match won in all stages up to the fina].s.6
However, the situation is slightly different for the finals.






















Substituting (2L1) into (10), x must satisfy
(25) n(x*)/2(x*)[y_c(x*)J —c(x*).
Solving for c(x*) in (25) and using (2I) we have16





soWi —W2exceeds I whenever n(x*)/c(x*) < 2, precisely condition (13)
guaranteeing existence of a unique symmetric equilbrium at each stage. The
tariff for winning the last match exceeds all the rest if incentives are to
be maintaIned at x4 throughout the tournament,
As noted at the beginning of the paper, the jump In the top prize
fundamentally is due to the fact that the finals is the last match to be
played. Linearity of reward in previous stages appears paradoxical on these
terms. The fact that the horizon draws closer as the game proceeds seems to
require increasing incremental rank—rewards to maintain incentives. How-
ever, offsetting this is the fact that the probability of reaching the top
increases with survival, so the shorter horizon is effectively discounted by
a smaller amount. The two effects exactly cancel each other at every stage
except the last.
The following example is instructive for illustrating the result
and for showing how other prize structures affect incentives. Suppose
h(x) -xand c(x) -xwhere r andare positive constants. Defining
y5 =x,application of (17) and (18) gives the recursions
(27) y—(.)(v
—W ) S I s—i s+i
(28) — BV5_1+(1—17
where B —(1—fl/2E)/2.The usual manipulations of (27) and (28) imply a










It is discounted future interrank rewards that determines effort at each
stage, where the discount ratedepends on the probability of winning
(=1/2)and the cost and arrival time distribution parameters n and c. The
discount rate Is positive so long as n/c < 2. Substituting (30) into (27)




Thevalue of eligibility depends on the level of rewards. For a given
reward structure it is easy to show that V5 is declining in n/c. The reason
is that less effort is expended at any stage as n/c falls, from (30).
The achievement of a target effort level x requires, for each
stage except the last, from (29)
— — (-4--)(i — $)(X)c fors —1,...,n.18
The spread between first and second place money must be larger than this:




.1/Cl — ), whichranges between 1.0 and
2.0. It can be shown that a relative winning increment in excess of
11(1 —a)results in monotonically increasing effort and quality of play as
the game proceeds through its stages, and that a relative increment of less
than 1/(1 —B)results in monotonically decreasing effort In later stages.
The Incentive consequences of some other reward schemes follow
from (30):
(i) Winner—Take—All
The reward structure specifies W ) 0 and W80 for s > 2. Here
(29) implies x —(.)w1a1.The expected quality of play at each stage
is larger than the previous stage. Effort rises more or less than
geometrically across stages as c1. It rises geometrically if c- 1.
(ii) Win, Place and Show Money Only.








for s > 2
fl/C
— W2)
whichyields an interstage quality of play pattern similar to winner—take—
all in stages prior to the semi—finals. It remains true that W1 —
W2
must19
be larger than (W2 -3)(1
—8)1for final round effort to be larger than
effort in the semifinals.
(iii) Geometric Inverse Rank Rule
Suppose the prize ratio between adjacent ranks maintains a
constant value 1 +, with> 0. For example, if'-1then the Rth place
reward Is twice as large as the (R+1)st reward and the purse is split
equally among all ranks. Table 1 is roughly of this form (except for W1.)
4e find, for B(1) < 1
(n/c.1tJ
C $ "1 *3 8
xs 1_B(1+)1 +
— B









In all parameter configurations effort is decreasing in s or Increasing with
survival. The intensity of play is largest in the finals and smallest in
the fir8t round.
IV. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
The result on incentive maintenance survives generalization to a
broader class of preferences and win technologies.20
Risk Aversion. The preference structure implicit in the problem
above is strongly additive; linear in income and convex In effort. Suppose
instead that preferences take the additive form U(W) —c(x8), where c(x)
is as before and 1J(W) is increasing, but not necessarily linear in W. Then
the entire analysis goes through by merely replacing W5 with U.(W3) wherever
it appears. Incentive maintenance requires a constant difference in the
utility of rewards U(W51) —U(W2)in all stages prior to the finals, but
still requires a jump in the interrank difference in utiilty of winning the
finals. Figure 1 applies so long as the ordinate is relabeled, with U(W)
replacing W. If players are risk averse then tJ"(W) < 0 and the incentive
maintenance prize structure requires strictly increasing incremental
monetary rewards between adjacent ranks, with a much larger increment be-
tween first and second place. The prize structure is everywhere strictly
convex in rank order, with greater concentration of the purse on the top
prizes than appears In figure 1.
The result is related to an "income effect." When (.1(W) is non-
linear the relevant marginal cost of effort is roughly the marginal rate of
substitution between W and x, or —c'(x)/U'(W). At the target level of
effort c'(x*) is constant, but as a player continues and is guaranteed a
higher and higher rank iJ'(W) declines. The relevant marginal cost of effort
effectively increases in each successive stage. Convexity of reward is
required to overcome these wealth effects and maintain a player's interest
in advancing to a later stage of the game.
Symmetric Win Technologies. The property P(xx) P(x3x) and
p(x,x) 1/2 is crucial to the symmetric equilibrium resulting from specifi-
cation (1). Notice that the proof of constancy of interrank rewards (or
utility of rewards) for incentive maintenance in stages prior to the finals21
rests only on the fact that equilibrium is symmetric, with a survival prob—
ability of 1/2 at every stage of the game. Further, the jump in differen-
tial prize money between ranks one and two is due to the fact that the
chance of continuing to higher ranks ceases in the finals. Hence the result
applies to any symmetric probability specification resulting in a unique
symmetric equilibrium, in which p8 —1/2for all s. It remains to be seen
how much broader this class is compared with specification (1). One
intersting possibility is h(x1x)/[h(x1x3) +h(x.x1)]
with h1 > 0,
h2 < 0, and h12 < 0. Perhaps such a specification captures the direct
confrontation nature of competition better than (1).
Tie—Breakers and Consolation Matches. It is basically the sur-
vival aspects of the game that lead to the result in figure 1, so any change
in the game structure that preserves the "option value" of continuation
results in an incentive maintenanoe.prize schedule with similar features.
For example, consider an alteration in the structure of figure 2 in which a
branching consolation match is played among the losers of the semifinals,
but no other tie—breakers are allowed. Let and be the prizes of the
winner and loser in the finals as before; and let Wc and be the prizes of
the winner and loser in the consolation match. Then the remaining notation
in sections II and III remains intact.
Let us investigate the prize structure required to maintain effort
at x* in all matches, including the consolation match. In the finals we
know that incentives are determined by the spread —
W2.Similarly incen-
tives in the consolation match are determined, by Wc —
W3.
Therefore equal
effort requires W1 —- — — k(say). Let Vf be the value of reach-
ing the finals and let V0 be the value of the consolation match. Since




+ — c(x*)—k/2+— c(x*)






Therefore to guarantee effort x when s -2requires
-
W3
-k.But —- —impliesW -W2.The winner of the
consolation match gets the same prize as the loser of the finals. This
result Is less surprising once one recognizes that these two players win the
same number of matches in the overall tournament.
Given the constraint x5- x*, we have
V2(1/2)(VF —Vc)
+V—c(x*)—k+— 2c(x*)
Incentives in the quarter finals are set by V2 — k+ — W14—2c(xfl.
Therefore —xrequires V2 — — k,or — 2c(x*).Using (10) to
evaluate c(x*), we have c(x*) —(/c)k/LI,where n and e are evaluated at x.
Therefore —- (/2c)k< k — — W2 —since/2c is less than






Incentives at s -14 areset by V3 — sox14 -xrequires





— — k/2+c(x*)—(k/2)(1+rj/2c)< k. All lower interrank
differences equal W14 —ifx* is maintained for all s.23













—(k/2)[(/2c)—1]< 0, which impart a slight con-
cavity to the Incentive maintaining prize structure around rank J4•Other-
wise, its general appearance resembles figure 1 If and W2 are both as-
signed R -2.The schedule Is a little more complicated if effort in the
consolation match is constrained to be smaller than in the finals (andx5 is
constrained to equal x in all other stages). Nevertheless, it resembles
the previous case except > W and (W1 —U2) (U0 —U3).
The jump at
the top ranking prizes remains.
Equality between W2 and U0 required for constant x5 in this
example suggests that the incentive maintenence prize schedule in a complete
tie—breaking structure awards a constant prize ror each match won, irrespec-
tive of the stage or branch in which the win occurs. Such linearity arises
because complete tie—breakers at every stage require every person to play
the same number of matches in the overall tournament, and the design starts
to resemble a round robin, Certainly a round robin design awards a constant
prize for each match won In the problem analyzed here. Complete tie—
breakers eliminate the survival—elimination elements which are crucial to
8 players'incentives and strategies.Extra concentration of the purse on
the top ranking prize always is required for incentive purposes when tie—
breakers are incomplete and confined to later stages of the game. The
underlying logic also suggests that a qualitatively similar result applies
if the tournament structure involves double (or more) eliminations.
Interstage Dependence. That effort/expenditure In any match is
independent between stages implies a strong Markovian, strictly forward
looking propertyof the solution that greatly simplifies analysis. The2
analyticalproblem is more complex if the path by which a contestant arrives
at any stage affects either the productivity or cost of subsequent effort.
For example, previous effort may increase subsequent productivity (or reduce
subsequent costs) through a force of momentum or reinforcement, similar to a
learning effect. Or current expenditure may deplete energy reserves and
increase subsequent costs or reduce subsequent productivity through fatigue
and "burnout."
Theanalytical issues raised by these forms of dependence are
clear enough: The sequence (xkJ+1 conditions the functions c(x) or h(x3).
Define a state variable z5 as a function of the sequence (xk}s+1 of previous
actions. Since z3 is given in round s and Is an argument of c(x) or p5 in
(2), it follows that V5 is alsoafunction of z3. Therefore currentx8not
only affects the probability of continuation. It also has a direct effect
on the value of continuation. In the burnout case we have 3V3/3z5 < 0;
whereas momentum Implies v5/az3 > 0. In contemplating action at s a player
rationally takes account of its incremental direct effects on subsequent
valuations (the derivatives above multiplied by dz3_1/dx3) as well as on the
probability of continuing, with the realization that current and possible
future opponents are doing the same thing.
A complete analysis of between stage spillovers Is enormously
complicated by the fact that a player's optimum strategy depends on the
sequence of opponents' past actions as well as on his own and raises dif-
ficult issues of proving existence of equilibrium that are beyond the scope
of this work. Even if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it may be
asymmetric. The best response functions may appear as in figure .For
example, if fatigue is a factor and the j—player is working hard enough, the
i—player may find it attractive to slack off In the current match, trading25
off a higher probability of elimination against the gain of starting the
next match "fresh" and maintaining a possible winning edge in that (improba-
ble) match. Nonuniqueness plays havoc with the backward recursion.
It is clear intuitively how these effects alter strategies at the
symmetric equilibrium.9 Let the spillover be confined to one round only.
Then the state variable is z51x5, so In choosing x8 in (Uor(9) an
additional term In p5V5_1/3x5 appears on the left hand side. This term is
positive In the case of momentum, so effort in the earlier stages tends to
be larger than indicated above. It is negative when fatigue Is Important,
so early round effort tends to be smaller than Indicated above: Players
tend to hold back effort and coast in the earliest rounds, saving energy for
later stages, should they reach them, where the stakes are larger. In the
first case the.prizestructure has to be more concentrated on the top to
insure a constant interstage intensity of play. In the case of fatigue it
must be less concentrated on the top to discourage early round coasting and
maintain a constant effort level across stages.°
Another more interesting form of interstage dependence arises when
players differ in talent.11 Then the prize structure affects survival
probabilities and the natural selection of players by talent through various
stages of the game. These selection effects interact in an important way
with incentives.
The Poisson specification offers an attractive parameterization in
terms of proportional hazards. Index talent by I and write h1(x)a1h(x).
An I—player is stronger than a J—player if > because I has a winning
edge of czi/( +a)over J if both exert equal effort. This problem
actually is technically less demanding than the case discussed above because
the backward recursion methodology applies directly. Here V81 in (2) is26
replaced by its expectation as of stage s, and the expected value of
continuation depends on the distribution of talents of players still alive
at s. In choosing a current strategy each player rationally contemplates
the identities of pr'obable future opponents, which in turn depend on the win
probabilities of players in other matches, the conditional talent distribu-
tion surviving the previous stage and the pairing (or seeding) rules of the
game. These interactions provide an interstage linkage that is absent in
the problem addressed here.
The complexity of this more general problem arises from the fact
that the expected value E5V3_1 for any player in (2) depends on what players
are doing in other matches at the same stage. This intermatch dependence
means that strategies are not determined on a 8trictly pairwise basis, as
they are when players are equally talented. Rather, the effort decision
depends on the decisions of players in all other matches as well as on the
decision of the specific opponent. Therefore, it is necessary to study the
sequence of simultaneous 2 player games through the stages. While the
mechanics of this are conceptually straightforward, analytical solutions are
impossible to obtain. Results must be obtained from computer simulation,
which awaits future work. It remains to be seen how the horizon effect
identified here affects the distribution of play intensity throughout the
tournament and how the prize and seeding structure help assure that the best
player wins.
Perhaps study of these highly structured and simple environments
ultimately will illuminate a much bigger set of problems of incentive and
selection in the labor market more generally. If so, this work may be a
little less frivolous than appears on the surface.27
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FOOTNOTES
I am indebted to Barry Nalebuff for discussion and correspondence that
helped generalize the result and clarify its Interpretation; to Gary Becker,
James Friedman, Sandy Grossman and Nancy Stokey for advice at an early stage
of the work; and to Robert Tamura for research assistance. The National
Science Foundation provided financial support.
1An esteemed economist and (lessesteemed) golfer is said to have
proposed expandIng the dIameter of the cup by a factor of three. The Royal
and Ancient society has not yet acted on this proposal.
do not mean to deny that nonmonetary considerations suchaspride,
self-esteem, and the desire for fame do not influence actions. Winning a
prestigious tournament has great value apart fromdirectprize money In the
form of endoresements and future appearance money, for reasons discussed in
Rosen (1981). Many prestigious tournaments offer smaller purses, probably
for this reason.
3A related discussionappears in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Nalebuff and
StiglItz (1983) consider equilibria involving mixed strategies.
The precise rules ofplay and procedures used to determine winners
affect the functional forms of c(x) and h(x). For viable games the rules
and calibration of scores must be set so that (13) holds. An Authority is
needed because equipment manufacturers and individual players have strong
private incentievs to create a winning edge by introducing new styles,
techniquesof play and complementary capital, Many of thesechanges are
beneficialand improvethesocial value of the game, However, those that
greatlyescalate the collective costs of all players relative to value for
the group as a whole are prohibited. O'Keeffe et a].. (198Z) provide a
different and interesting discussion of rules in terms of monitoring.30
5Consider a tour of length T over a season, in which the tournament is
repeated T times among the same players. It is conceptually straigtfor—
ward to work out the season (or partial season) rnultlnomial distribution of
earnings among players.
6The purse must be large enough to supportV5> 0 for all s. For a
given purse. it is obvious that feasible x is bounded from above for this
condition to hold. Another bound is implied by contestants' outside
opportunities, but is ignored here.
7However, effort has little effect on outcomes when r)/c is small. Such
games generate little spectator interest and offer small prizes.
8That the structure of the game interacts with the incentive effects of
prizes is further illustrated by the example in the appendix. The
sequencing of that game differs from this one.
9Again, it is conceivable that the rules and standards of play are
devised to eliminate the asymmetric equilibria in figure 4. Notice that the
occurrence of turning points in the response functions of figure 3 at
x1x3 rules out asymmetric equilibriain the problem above.
10Stage dependence without memory is easily analyzed by allowing s to
shift the cost or hazard functions. The analysis above is only slightly
modified. For example write c(x5)f(s). f'(s) > 0 implies reinforcement
because marginal cost declines in later stages. f'(s) < 0 implies fatigue.
The reader is invited to rework the example in section III with this cost
functionto verify the statements in the text.
11Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that a larger prize spread is required
to self—screen less talented players. However, in most games entry is based
on direct performance indicators, not only on self—selection.31
Appendix
Instead of sequential eliminations with paired comparisons, think
of an outright race. n players start, all racing against each other. The
first player to cross the finish line is declared overall winner and
achieves the highest rank. The remaining n —1.players continue racing,
resetting their effort to take account of the fact that there is one less
player to compete against. The first among these n —1to hit the finish
line achieves the second highest rank. Then the n —2remaining players vie
for third place, again resetting their efforts to account for the lesser
number of players and the prize money remaining, etc.
This problem also has a recursive structure. LetV be the value
of' racing when t players remain. Then.
(A.1) Vt =maxt'n—t÷1 +(1Pt)Vt_1 —c(x)}
xt
where Pt is the conditional probability of winning. Assuming Poisson
arrivals and equally talented players
h(X,)
(A.2) t1 Eh(X.)ii
for player i, where the index of summation for j is over allremaining
players including himself. Pt is independent of past action, by assumption.
The Nash solution at each stage is symmetric and sharesmany of the features
noted above. The only substantial difference is an adjustment for the
change in the number of opponents at each stage.32
Analyzing this game in the same manner as the example in section








Notethat in the text, the equivalent of "t" in (A.3)—(A.5) is 2, since
there is exactly one opponent at each stage. In fact, substituting t2
into (A.5) yields the expression forused in section III. However, here
the number of opponents is changing as the game proceeds so the equilibrium
conditional probability of winning at each stage is l/t rather than 1/2.
incorporates this effect.
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The ordering of events is reversed from the text (since survival signals a
smaller reward rather than a larger one), but the solution has similar
features after taking account of the stage—varying discount factor.33
Time varying discounts and the presence of the factor (t—1)/t2 in
A.6 make it more difficult to find the Incentive maintaining prize structure
because the schedule contains no linear segments. Some experimentation
shows that it has both concave and convex portions, and the prize money need
not pile up on the top ranks. This example is designed to show that the
tournament design influences the incentive maintenance schedule, but it
otherwise has very limited interest due to the assumed strong Markovian
property that the probability of winning at any stage is independent of how
far one has traveled in the past. Putting memory into this game leads to
the same problems as were identified in section IV. This process is there-
fore better suited to tournaments with a natural survival—sequential
structure, such as In the text.314
TABLE 1
Men's Tennis: 19814 On—Site prize Money Ditribution Formula,
Volvo Grand Prix Circuit
Rank
Prcen ofpurseB









1 19.23 27.27 20.51 27.27
2 9.62 13.614 10.26 11.36
3—14 14.81 6.82 5.614 5.91
5—8 2.1414 2.95 3.08 3.18
9—16 1.141 1.36 1.92 2.10
17—32 .77 .68 1.03 1.25
33—614 .145 .140 .143
65—128 .22
Notes
aCovers 80 international single elimination events. On—site money does not
include contributions 'to end—of—season bonus poois. 62.5 percent of the
$2.14M singles pool goes to the top 14seasonranked players and 614.2 percent
of the $.6M doubles pool goes to the top 14teams.
bTotal tournament on—site purse split 78 percent for singles, 22 percent for
doubles. Figures refer to shares of singles and doubles components of the
total respectively. Each person in a tied rank receives the share
indicated. Weighted shares may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
CFrench Open, Wimbledon, U.S. Open and Australian Open. Draw refers to
number of players or teams. 96 draw singles events are slightly more
concentrated on top ranks.
d_site total purse of $25,000 or more.
Source: Official 19814 professional Tennis Yearbook of the Men's
International Professional Tennis Council. New York, 19814.35
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Figure 1: Incentive Maintaining Prize Structure
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Figure 3: Best Reply Functions
Figure 4: Asyannetric Equilibria
Xj
X(xi)
Xi s,,.,
/
/,/
X (xi)
X(xi) /
/
///
'a//
X(x)